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Abstract Starting from a comparison of the similarities between a poem by
Sylvia Plath called Tulips and the words of someone in the thrall of a delusion
I develop a phenomenology of how mood is basic to our articulation of the
world. To develop this argument I draw on Heidegger’s (1962) concept of
attunement [befindlichkeit] and his contention that basic emotions open up
aspects of the world for closer inspection and articulation. My thesis in this
paper is that there is an underlying structural similarity between the forms of
words used in poems and those found in medically diagnosed delusions and
this similarity is based on the role of mood in both arenas. The difference, I
argue, is that although both forms of articulation are negotiated ‘as if’ the
subject matter was literal, the person writing the poem is self-aware that their
uses of language are figurative and metaphorical. This is because the emotional
lens they use to describe a situation poetically can always be removed by a
return to a ground-mood of acceptance, that prevents them from becoming lost
in the poetical mood. The person experiencing psychosis, on the other hand, is
unable to extricate herself from the mood that underlies their delusional utter-
ances as they have lost access to the ground-mood that the poet takes for
granted. I illustrate the point using Hume’s famous statement about the mood
he philosophises in and look at ways sufferers from delusions could regain a
sense of the non-literal projections of their words.
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I will start with a quote. It is an excerpt from a poem by Sylvia Plath (1965) in her
collection Ariel. The poem is called Tulips:
The tulips are too red in the first place, they hurt me.
Even through the gift paper I could hear them breathe
Lightly, through their white swaddlings, like an awful baby.
Their redness talks to my wound, it corresponds.
They are subtle: they seem to float, though they weigh me down,
Upsetting me with their sudden tongues and colour,
A dozen red lead sinkers round my neck.
Nobody watched me before, now I am watched.
The tulips turn to me, and the window behind me
Where once a day the light slowly widens and slowly thins,
And I see myself, flat, ridiculous, a cut-paper shadow
Between the eye of the sun and the eyes of the tulips,
And I have no face, I have wanted to efface myself.
The vivid tulips eat my oxygen (Plath 1965).
The poem these lines are taken from is a very sad, beautiful evocation of a time Plath
spent in hospital. However, if these lines are read under the aspect of a literal
description of that time, they suddenly appear like the words of someone in the thrall
of a paranoid delusion (e.g. that the tulips hurt her, the personification of the tulips as
breathing, the references to the tulips watching her and the thought that she has no
face). This could be compared with words from a woman who has experienced
delusions called Esso Leete1:
It was evening and I was walking along the beach near my college in Florida.
Suddenly my perceptions shifted. The intensifying wind became an omen of
something terrible. I could feel it becoming stronger and stronger; I was sure it
was going to capture me and sweep me away with it. Nearby trees bent threat-
eningly toward me and tumbleweed chased me. I became very frightened and
began to run. However, though I knew I was running, I was making no progress. I
seemed suspended in space and time (Torrey 2001).
Here we can see a similar perception of the environment as animated. The obvious
difference is that Plath is writing from an ‘as if’ stance (by which I mean she is writing
‘as if’ these the plants were watching her but is able to step back into commonsense
after writing), whereas the delusion of Leete seems to be a literal apprehension of the
world, in that it guides her behaviour and her emotional reaction to the situation.
In this paper I will outline a theoretical understanding of the similarities between
poetry and delusions and explain why poets are self-aware of what they are doing with
words whereas sufferers from delusions are not. I will do this in terms of the back-
ground structure provided by moods and argue that, crucially, people with delusions do
not have access to the ground-mood of acceptance that allows us to fall into other
1 This quote is taken from a book by Torrey (2001)
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moods without becoming lost in them.2 I will then go on to treat the subject of how
moods can be seen to operate when philosophising to illustrate my position. I will look
at Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as language going on holiday to back up my
claims. Next I analyse a competing theory of delusions by Currie and Jureidini (2001)
that conceives delusions as ‘imaginings’ that are mistaken for beliefs and show how my
position can encompass their claims and is phenomenologically richer while doing the
same explanatory work. Finally I will briefly survey what this conception of the role of
moods in delusions implies about the treatment of those suffering from delusions and
examine ways we can use this understanding to lead words back from a ‘metaphysical’
use to an everyday use.
1 Mood and the ‘as if’ Stance
One possible way to understand poetical discourse is given by Heidegger in Being and
Time (1962). He claims:
In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s
state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a
disclosing of existence (Heidegger 1962).
‘State-of-mind’ is an unfortunate translation of Befindlichkeit as it suggests that he is
referring to a private mental state, which is what he wanted to avoid. ‘Attunement’
better emphasises that Heidegger is putting forward the idea that our mooded appre-
hension of the world underpins and gives sense to our cognition of the world. To
summarise his position, he argues that we are rooted and orientated in the world by the
way it ‘matters’ to us (e.g. through moods (Heidegger 1962)). Heidegger argues that the
way the world matters to us is a basic framework within which cognition operates
(Heidegger 1962). One way of understanding this is by highlighting that moods provide
the background on which anything can show up as significant and worthy of attention,
which is the point at which cognition comes into play.
A more contentious claim that Heidegger can be understood to be making is that
moods actually open up for us a way the world really is, rather than being merely a
subjective colouring to a scientifically-described, physical world.3 This claim was also
made by Wittgenstein when he wrote that, ‘the world of the happy man is a different
one from that of the unhappy man’ (Wittgenstein 1974). A possible way of cashing out
this counterintuitive approach to affect is to say that the fact of the world as the place
we inhabit (as creatures with certain drives and needs) is the ground on which all our
other ways of making sense of it (e.g. through science) rest. In other words, the
interpersonally constituted world, with its many and various layers of culture and
meaning, is not a secondary or deficient mode of grasping the world to the way the
2 I take the mood that allows us to contemplate other moods as being one of acceptance as this is the mood
Cavell states that we need to overcome to the skeptical mood. ‘Whereas what the sceptic suggests is that since
we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be a function of knowing. The world is to be
accepted…’ (Cavell 1976)
3 ‘A mood assails us. It comes neither from Boutside^ nor from Binside^ but arises out of Being-in-the-world,
as a way of such Being’ (Heidegger 1962).
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world is understood through abstract contemplation in the form of science. If this is
accepted then it can be argued that moods open this world up for our inhabitation both
by attuning us with others and by constituting which objects in the environment appear
meaningful and thereby salient to us. In this sense, our attunement to the world means
that moods can be said to constitute our objective environment, rather than just being
‘inner’ states.4
This claim is backed up by contemporary work in the philosophy of emotions. In
order to interact with the world, according to theorists such as Gigerenzer and
Hookway, we employ heuristics or ‘gut-feelings’ (Gigerenzer 2007) that, on the whole,
allow us to operate in the world efficiently without going through immense amounts of
computation. (Hookway 2002). That is, we use our moods as a basis for cognition of
the world. As the term ‘gut-feelings’ indicates the claim is that our inquiries into the
natural world are regulated through our emotional and mooded engagement with that
same world. This position is taken further in Gibson’s (1986) notion of affordances,
where an emotion:
[R]efers to a relational property, the mode of presentation consists in an
action orientation that makes the property appear in a certain way, in the
case of fear something dangerous appears as something to be avoided
(Hufendiek 2016).
So the person perceives a feature or features of the environment in terms of their
own abilities or action-readiness. This implies that the objective world is constituted
and perceived as being an environment in which the properties of the world are related
to the behavior and the behavior-readiness of the person. This highlights that the
background structure of moods and emotions determines how we can perceive the
world and different moods and basic emotions will open up different realities for us.
For example science may be understood as having to be carried out in a mood of cool
detachment in order for the results to be generally applicable whereas working for
social justice requires a mood of concerned engagement that relies on the human
capacity for empathy and kindness. This may be an oversimplification (and the scope
of the essay does not allow me to go into more detailed argumentation here) but the fact
that moods and emotions underlie our cognition is strongly suggested by the point
made above that our environment is constituted by our abilities and our action
orientation and we rely on emotions to make certain properties salient and meaningful
for us. A change in basic emotion therefore would dictate a change in how we perceive
the environment e.g. as hostile, welcoming, boring etc. and also what story we tell
about the that environment. If we are driven by a threat to our person the environment
itself becomes threatening and we look for ways to avoid the impending attack. An
overactive threat system makes everything seem potentially harmful and the narratives
we weave about our situation would thereby become based on this new way of looking
at the world. This way of looking at the world is not a mere ‘subjective colouring’, but
rather is the world showing itself in relation to our needs and concerns as an organism.
This conception of the role of emotions should be seen as a sketch fleshing out
4 A more detailed argument for this position is made by Cavell (1981) and Mulhall (1997). They call this idea
an ‘epistemology of moods’.
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Heidegger’s claim about mood and I hope this will have given at least some reasons to
accept this point before developing the claim further.
The point of this digression into Heideggerian ontology is to try to identify the
aspect in which poetry can be seen as similar to delusions. Taking Heidegger’s quote,
alongside the elaboration of the idea of attunement, the link between poetry and
delusions can be seen as the commonality of focus on the expression of an underlying
mood that permeates the person’s inhabitation of the world. A feature of art in trying to
accurately express a mood is that (as is found by poets) only a certain ordering of words
will do to express the particular mood. For both the poet and the delusional person only
certain words will do, in the same way that poems are un-paraphrasable. By this I am
simply pointing out the fact that an exegesis of a poem cannot capture the aesthetic
effect of the poem itself, but rather must explain what those particular words, in that
particular, order do to the reader through the particular language used. We can make
this point (again using a Heideggerian concept) by saying that these words are ‘ready-
to-hand’ for the delusional person. The idea here is that everyday orderings of words
just do not capture the mood the person is trying to communicate (because the mood is
completely ‘out of the ordinary’) and so new ways of talking about objects and
situations are required. What is being attempted is an expression of the mood through
which the person is inhabiting the world. In both cases we could try and identify the
mood the person is trying to capture for example we might say that in Plath’s case, she
is elaborating a despairing tranquillity and in Leete’s case, an ominous foreboding. This
would, however, precisely miss the point that only the particularity of the words they
actually use really expresses the mood they inhabit.
The ‘as if’ stance of Plath can be seen as a sense in which she is aware of what she is
attempting through words, whereas for Leete the mood is so basic and all-
encompassing that there is no space between the sense she makes of the mood and
her general orientation in the world. For Leete there is no recourse to the basic mood of
acceptance, where the person has a strong sense of confidence in the commonsense
everyday understanding of the world from an objective viewpoint, from which she
could contemplate the mood that underlies the delusion. I would contend that it is the
lack of the basic atmosphere of acceptance that would allow a contemplative stance (or
what I have been calling the ‘as if’ stance in writing poetry) which is the element that
separates the language-game of poetry from that of the delusional person’s expression
of a (mood inflected) world from which they are unable to escape.5 Acceptance can be
taken as an underlying ground mood that allows us to fall into other moods without
becoming completely lost in them.6 In other words, in the case of a delusion there is no
fall back position from which to extricate themselves from the all-encompassing mood
of the delusion. In the case of poetry, the mood that is expressed can always be
dispelled through a return to the everyday atmosphere of acceptance, which is still
available to the person writing the poetry.
5 By ‘atmosphere’ here I am indicating that the mood permeates the relation between the person and their
environment as a whole rather than a specific object in the environment.
6 I am using the term ‘ground mood’ in the sense that Heidegger in What is metaphysics? (Heidegger 1993)
calls anxiety a ‘grundstimmung’. That is, as a fundamental mood that provides an absolutely basic framework
of meaningfulness through which a world can show up. Acceptance is a basic mood in the sense that it
underlies our ability to orientate according to commonsense. Here I claim that someone experiencing
psychosis is unable to return to this basic mood.
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2 Language ‘on Holiday’
An example of mood playing a part in our ‘wording of the world’ (Cavell 1989) can
also be found in philosophy, most famously in the writing of Hume. He describes a
particular reverie that he finds himself in when philosophising:
I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most
deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly
deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these
clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some
avocation, and lively impression of the senses, which obliterate all these chi-
meras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my
friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these
speculations, they appear so cold and strain’d and ridiculous, that I cannot find in
my heart to enter into them farther (Hume 1978).
In this example Hume identifies a certain mood that goes with his philosophising, a
melancholy or delirium that he dispels by returning to the social world. This illustrates
the idea I put forward above that a ground-mood of acceptance allows a person to
return from a mood in which the world seems altered from the everyday commonsense
world. The mood in this case could be labelled ‘Sceptical’ and it might be suggested
that the product of trying to find words for such a mood can be found arrayed through
much of the literature of modern philosophy starting with Descartes. I should empha-
size that this claim is not saying that philosophy is merely bad poetry, rather, as I
suggested above, it is helpful to understand attunement as opening up for us aspects of
the world and certain aspects of reality that may only be available in the Sceptical
mood. Descartes himself states that if he were to announce seriously that he is willing to
doubt whether the hands before him are his own, as dictated by his sceptical method,
then he would be taken for a madman (Descartes 1988). This acknowledges that
without the ‘as if’ stance the ideas of philosophers would often be taken for delusions.
This is something Sass (1994) hints at when looking at the writings of Schreber through
Wittgenstein’s analysis of solipsism. Solipsism attested to without the ‘as if’ stance
would undoubtedly be considered delusional, but as with scepticism it can seem the
unavoidable conclusion of a philosophical meditation. It is a typical experience for a
philosopher to sometimes feel that ordinary everyday ways of orientating in the world
must be wrong and that thinking has lead them to some new revelation about how the
world really is. This, of course, has obvious parallels with the onset of delusions with
the exception that such a thought as solipsism can usually be forgotten through some
distraction found in everyday activities or socialising, because, as Hume says, the cure
is in our natural habits.
To extend the analogy between philosophy and delusions, it might be helpful to look
at Wittgenstein’s claim that, ‘philosophical problems arise when language goes on
holiday’ (Wittgenstein 1963). By this, I think he means that philosophical problems
arise when words are no longer being projected in their familiar everyday sense. The
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idea that language has left the everyday suggests, firstly, that it is not doing any ‘work’
but also that it has left home for a distant land. The first sense might reflect the idea that,
as with poetry, philosophy tends to deal with matters detached from everyday practical
concerns. The second sense could be taken to mean that there are realms that can only
be charted from this self-imposed exile from the everyday. I do not think that the first
sense is necessarily a damning criticism of such uses, for instance, one way of
understanding ‘holiday’ is that of being in a mood of relaxed enjoyment and of course
in contemporary society a holiday is taken to ‘recharge the batteries’, that is, to return to
the everyday with a new appreciation of life. From this it could be said that philosophy
happens when we take up a view on life from the perspective of a mood that differs
from our normal practically concerned one and which enables us to return with a better
sense of what is important. Although this may seem an unwarranted elaboration of a
passing comment by Wittgenstein, it is arguable that language going on holiday is an
apt way of describing delusions. It is perhaps Wittgenstein’s sense of how close
philosophising can be to insanity that encouraged him to use the idea of ‘therapy’ as
a name for what he was trying to achieve in his own work. The warning that is inherent
in Wittgenstein assertions in Philosophical Investigations is that if we do not remind
ourselves of the primary projections of our words and their ‘home’ in the everyday we
risk becoming entangled in the new pictures of reality we create. If, as I have argued,
the everyday sense of the world requires an atmosphere of acceptance then this warning
may capture the way the person suffering from delusions becomes lost in their words
and may suggest a possible route home, that of being reminded of the everyday
projections of words.
3 Delusions as Imaginings
At this point it is necessary to contrast the position I have been developing with one that
can seem markedly similar, namely Currie and Jureidini’s theory (2001) that delusions
are ‘imaginings’ that are mistakenly taken for beliefs by the person with the delusions.
The similarity of their theory to my account could be articulated as the way people
suffering from delusions take what are merely flights of the imagination in poets,
namely ‘imaginings’, to be beliefs. In other words, the ‘as if’ stance that contains
‘imaginings’ outside of the realm of actual belief, is not available for the delusional
person to adopt and so there is no boundary between imaginings and beliefs. The
attraction of their theory is that it explains not only the reason why the delusion is not
questioned, but also why certain unusual experiences should give rise to what seem to
be beliefs that contradict a lot of other beliefs the person has. The relevant traits of an
imagining are that it is ‘much more easily triggered by perception than is belief’ (Currie
and Jureidini 2001) and ‘it is surely quite common to imagine all sorts of wild
hypotheses in response to an odd experience’ (ibid.). As well as this, with imaginings
there is not the same pressure to resolve the tension with other beliefs. In other words,
there is a natural ‘suspension of disbelief’ when imagining. Finally, they are not
normally revised in the light of evidence as the main point of imaginings is that they
deal with the non-actual.
The main problem with their theory comes when they try to account for why
someone should mistake an imagining for a belief. They put this down to some, as
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yet unknown, ‘sub-personal capacity’ (ibid.) that is damaged and thereby rule out the
possibility of empathy. Empathy, they argue, is impossible because, in the same way as
it would be impossible to empathise with someone who had lost the capacity to
recognise people by their faces because of brain damage, it is impossible for us to
imagine what it would be like to mistake a belief for an imagining because our sub-
personal capacity is intact. The first problem with this is that it rules out a priori the
possibility of empathising with the person suffering from delusions, which is a way of
denying community with actual people without good reason. The need to acknowledge
a person as an equal partner in conversation necessitates an attitude of taking the
possibility of finding sense in a delusion as being an empirical matter to be explored
through conversation. The second problem, is that this a priori claim is based on a
hypothesis that there is some underlying damage to the brain that is as yet undiscov-
ered. The contrast with my account using Heidegger’s concept of attunement is that my
position does not require the positing of such damage and thereby keeps open the
possibility of empathising with the person with delusions.7
If we ignore the claim about the mistaking of imaginings as beliefs as being due to
damage to a sub-personal capacity and look at the phenomenological claims then their
account seems to be on firmer ground. They claim that, ‘the deluded person fails to
monitor the self-generatedness of her imagining that P’ (ibid.) and so the imagining can
come to seem like it is generated by their contact with the world in the normal way that
beliefs are. This idea that imaginings are taken for beliefs because of their changed
phenomenology can be seen to fit with the picture of psychosis that I have been
developing. Whereas I talk about an ‘as-if’ stance in poetry that can only be taken if
there is an underlying mood of acceptance to return to (which is not possible in the case
of delusions), they talk about imaginings having the same phenomenological character
as beliefs. My account can encompass their claim by positing that delusions arise
because the mood of acceptance is not available from which to discriminate imaginings
as imaginings through a commonsense orientation to the world. In other words,
imaginings and beliefs take on a similar phenomenological character because the
person is engulfed in an all-encompassing mood. I believe that my account provides
a richer phenomenological context that can show how their account is possible without
needing to posit damage to a sub-personal capacity. To sum up what I have been
saying, delusions can be seen as attempts to express a mode of attunement as a picture
of the reality the person suffering from delusions inhabits (in the way I have argued
poets and philosophers do). However, the person with the delusion is unable to return to
the everyday mood of basic acceptance from which to understand the expression in
terms of an ‘as-if’ stance.
4 Returning Words to the Everyday
The depiction of delusions as expressions of a mooded apprehension of the world
(explored above) suggests avenues for both empathising with the delusional person and
also possible ways for overcoming delusions. Central to this understanding of delusions
7 My position would not be undermined if such damage to a sub-personal capacity were found and would in
fact suggest the phenomenology of such damage for the person suffering from the delusion.
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is the way that a return to the everyday requires the return to an atmosphere of
acceptance. In the arguments above I focussed on the way that mood influences the
‘ready-to-hand’ nature of particular words that are involved in creating new pictures of
reality. However, the relation between mood and words is not a one-way street and of
course particular orderings of words can in their turn induce moods in the audience
which is part of the attraction of reading poetry. As Heidegger states:
Publicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to the ‘they’…not only has in
general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ‘makes’ them for
itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood an orator speaks. He must
understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them
aright (Heidegger 1962).
With this in mind, if we understand the words of the delusional person as coming
from a particular mode of attunement, then careful attention to their words might allow
the interlocutor to arrive at an intimation of the mode of attunement the delusional
person inhabits. Any attempt to help the person will require re-establishing acceptance
and this can only be done through an attempt to reconstruct how their present mood
shapes their picture of reality. Without the proper acknowledgement of their situation,
the person with the delusion will feel that he or she is not being understood and so is
likely to withdraw from conversation.
In terms of overcoming delusions, one particular study by Giannini (2001)
seems relevant. Giannini talks about his use of fiction in getting adolescents to
open up about fantasy worlds in which they may be thinking through real
world social problems. The young adults he saw were not psychotic as they
could distinguish these worlds from the real world. The therapy involved
getting the young adults to read a book as a focal point for discussion that
centred around the book’s plot and characters:
Gradually, connections and identifications developed between these patients and
the fictional characters. The ever-mutable fantasies and fixtures of the patient’s
inner world were inexorably translocated to World of Tiers [the book series which
Giannini instructed the patients to read]. Stable fantasies generated stable
symbolisations, and the symbolic language through which we communicated
finally became comprehensible. With this common medium, misunderstanding
decreased and mutual trust grew (Giannini 2001).
The relevance of this study to the situation of a person with delusions is that
fiction and poetry provide a point of focus for a discussion where reality is
bracketed and so enables, as Giannini says, a neutral context in which mutual
acceptance can be established. Particularly pertinent to what has been argued in
this paper is that entering a fictional world through reading would possibly
allow the delusional person to escape the all-encompassing nature of their own
delusional mood and give them an alternative to their own picture of reality. Of
course fiction is an excellent way of altering someone’s mood. It would be
useful if the person could relate their own situation to the characters in a book
as a discussion of this could give an interlocutor a better understanding of the
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delusion. However, it is possible that the fiction itself may become part of the
delusion, in that it might be taken to contain hidden messages and, of course,
especially in schizophrenia, people can have problems with focussing their
attention. The problem with attention could be dealt with by watching a film
instead, which could equally provide a context and a focus for discussion. Or
another suggestion could be that sufferers from delusions could be encouraged
to read poetry as a way of understanding how words can depict a mood but
also come to an understanding that the mood itself can be reflected upon in a
more tranquil mood defined by acceptance. The incorporation of the fictional
content of a novel, a poem or a film into a person’s delusion could itself be
discussed and used as a key for understanding the person and the way the
mood of the delusion changes in relation to what is going on in the person’s
environment. The key point to be taken from this study is how a fictional
context for using words can give the sufferer from delusions the space to reflect
on their own mooded articulation of the world and see how it is possible to
move between moods in our comprehension of the world. If this is done in the
safe space of therapy it might open up the possibility for the person suffering
from delusions to use this insight in everyday life.
Finally, the last point to be made in this section, is based on Wittgenstein’s
claim that his form of ‘therapy’ tries to, ‘bring words back from their meta-
physical to their everyday use’ (Wittgenstein 1963). The method used by
ordinary language philosophers involves overcoming scepticism by focussing
on our actual use of language in everyday contexts. The way this could be
applied to delusions might be to try to get the delusional person to write poetry
about their delusion. In such a way it might be possible to re-establish an ‘as
if’ stance to their delusions by allowing them to give their mood its full reign
in an appropriate context. Again, the product of such writing may help others
to understand the person, which would be an end in itself. Also, objectifying
their delusion in a poem may enable the person suffering the delusion to obtain
a distance from the delusion by having it independent of them in writing.
Again the key insight for the person to gain is that they need not be trapped
by a mood e.g. of paranoia, but can express a mood and then reflect on it from
a mood of acceptance. Support for this claim is given in a study by Bernard
et al. (2006) where people who had suffered from psychosis were asked to
write about the most stressful aspects of their experience and treatment when
psychotic. It was found that this helped reduce symptoms of trauma surround-
ing the psychosis in comparison with others who did not write about it. This
would suggest that writing about the delusional experience (and especially
given the freedom of form in writing a poem) could help the person to come
to terms with the experience and come to an external viewpoint on their
delusions opening up space for them to let go of those delusions. Pennebaker
(1997) provides evidence for both the general psychological (as well as health
and intellectual) benefits that can accrue from the written disclosure of emo-
tionally traumatic events. The reason for such effects is not well understood at
present, but my arguments about the necessity of expressing a mooded appre-
hension of the world to return to a mood of acceptance might go some way
towards providing a rationale.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have put forward the claim that poetry might be one key for under-
standing the articulations of those suffering from delusions. I argue that poetry is one
way of ‘wording the world’ from a particular mood, but that it is open to the poet to
reflect on the mood they write about from the mood of acceptance and so see their
language as non-literal. For the sufferer from delusions this move seems to be unavail-
able as they are not able to access a mood of acceptance. I backed up these claims by
looking at the moods that philosophers, exemplified by Hume, write in and their
strategies for dispelling those moods and so remaining in the everyday. I looked at
one competing theory of delusions and after analysis found that my view can provide a
more comprehensive understanding of delusions. Finally taking the claims of this paper
further I looked at directions for using poetry in helping sufferers overcome delusions.
The view enumerated here suggests that more work should be done on looking
at similarities between how poets ‘word the world’ and how delusions are
understood by sufferers and that mood and basic emotions hold the key to
developing an understanding in this area. A final note would be that conditions
that include delusions as a symptom could have the stigma surrounding them
dispelled (however ridiculous this may sound to the adherent of the biomedical
approach) by viewing delusions as a form of poetry.
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License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bernard, M., Jackson, C., & Jones, C. (2006). Written emotional disclosure following first-episode psychosis:
effects on symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45(3), 403–
415.
Cavell, S. (1976). Must we mean what we say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cavell, S. (1981). The senses of Walden: an expanded edition. London: The University of Chicago Press.
Cavell, S. (1989). This new yet unapproachable America: lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein.
Albuquerque NM: Living Batch Press.
Currie, G., & Jureidini, J. (2001). Delusions, rationality, empathy: commentary on Davies et al. Philosophy,
Psychiatry and Psychology, 8(2–3), 159–162.
Descartes, R. (1988). Descartes: selected philosophical writings. Trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D.
Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giannini, A.J. (2001). Use of fiction in therapy. Online document. Psychiatric Times. http://www.
psychiatrictimes.com/articles/use-fiction-therapy. Accessed 14 April 2017.
Gibson, J. J. (1986). The ecological approach to visual perception. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.
Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings: short cuts to better decision making. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. (1993). What is metaphysics? In: D.F. Krell (ed), Basic writings, trans. D.F. Krell. London:
Routledge.
Hookway, C. (2002). Emotions and epistemic evaluations. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich, & M. Siegal (Eds.), The
cognitive basis of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hufendiek, R. (2016). Embodied emotions: a naturalist approach to a normative phenomenon. Oxford:
Routledge.
Philosophia (2017) 45:1697–1708 1707
Hume, D. (1978). In A. L. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), A treatise of human nature (Second ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mulhall, S. (1997). Can there be an epistemology of moods? In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Verstehen and humane
understanding: the 1995–1996 Royal Institue of philosophy lectures (pp. 191–210). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Writing about emotional experience as a therapeutic process. Psychological Science,
8(3), 162–166.
Plath, S. (1965). Ariel. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
Sass, L. A. (1994). The paradoxes of delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber and the schizophrenic mind. New York:
Cornell University Press.
Torrey, E. F. (2001). Surviving Schizophrenia (Fourth ed.). New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc..
Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical investigations, (Trans.) G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd.
Wittgenstein, L. (1974). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (trans.) D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London:
Routledge.
1708 Philosophia (2017) 45:1697–1708
